Uncovering the Goodhart's Law: Theory and Evidence by Yosuke Takeda & Atsuko Ueda
UNCOVERING THE GOODHART’S LAW:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
YOSUKE TAKEDA AND ATSUKO UEDA
Abstract. This paper addresses the Goodhart’s Law in a cash-
in-advance economy with monetary policy regime switching. Using
the Japanese data of the money velocity, we found that although
our cash-credit model fails to generate a downward trend in the
actual velocity, the model succeeds in terms of velocity’s variation
and correlations with money growth rates or nominal interest rates,
with procyclicality of velocity unpredictable.
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1. Introduction
The Goodhart’s Law says that ʠ any observed statistical regularity
will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control pur-
posesʡ (p.116, Goodhart, 1975). Following the recent papers exploring
potential roles of monetary aggregates (Estrella and Mishkin, 1997;
Nelson, 2002; Leeper and Roush, 2003; Miyao, 2005), this paper ad-
dresses the Goodhart’s Law in a monetary model where money stock
plays an explicit role in monetary policy rule. 1 The purpose of the
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1The EconLit says as of October 22, 2005, that the last paper including the
Goodhart’s Law in a title is Evans(1985). The issue is also put aside in the US
standard macroeconomics textbooks, with an exception of DeLong(2002) mention-
ing as follows:
”Political monetarism” crashed and burned in the early 1980s. It be-
came clear that stable control of the money stock was not easy to obtain.
It became clear that stable control of the money stock did not solve the
problems of stabilization policy because the velocity of money was un-
stable. Indeed, Goodhart’s law maintained that the better your control
over any particular measure of the money stock, the more unstable its
velocity would be (Goodhart, 1970). And the velocity of money turned
extraordinarily unstable after 1980.
In honor of Charles Goodhart, Chrystal and Mizen(2003) also deal with the Law
in details.
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paper is to generate numerical predictions for the Japanese data of
money velocity in a cash-in-advance economy with a Markov regime
switching monetary policy rule including money growth rates.
The model of the paper closely draws on Hodrick, Kocherlakota and
Lucas(1991), which develops a cash-credit model constructed for nu-
merical study on variability in the US money velocity. We modify the
model, incorporating instead of an exogenously given money growth
rates a generalized Taylor-type rule with money growth another ex-
planatory variable. Furthermore, the generalized monetary policy rule
is assumed to be state-dependent, following a Markov transition pro-
cess. An advantage of our model over Hodrick, Kocherlakota and Lu-
cas(1991) lies in handling an instrument rule of nominal interest rate,
not money growth. Considering the period of the US FRB Chairman
Paul Volker, the state-dependence of monetary policy also expresses
occasional focus on money growth in practice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 accounts for stochastic
properties of data on the velocity of money in Japan, suggesting that
unpredictable variations in money velocity is probably due to changes
in monetary policy. Section 3 introduces a cash-credit model of Lucas
and Stokey(1987), incorporating a state-dependent monetary policy
rule. In Section 4, we present a computational method of solving the
cash-credit model, estimating Markov regime switching equations of
the Japanese monetary policy. The computation results in a numerical
comparison between the model’s predictions and the actual velocity of
money. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Stochastic properties of money velocity in Japan
We account for stochastic structures of the money velocity in Japan,
which in terms of low variability of average money growth, Fried-
man(1983) evaluated more highly than US.2 Figure 1 shows the Japan-
ese quarterly data from 1967:1 to 2004:3. Our measure of velocity is
deﬁned as a ratio of (seasonally adjusted) nominal GDP divided by
M2+CDs(average amounts outstanding). It is apparent that, in spite
of the Friedman’s praises, the Japanese velocity data has a consistently
downward trend for the sample period. Though the data appears to
be more stable relative to the call rates or the money growth rates,
we can make sure of some observations in which the money velocity
ﬂuctuated to a considerable extent. The clearest is a rapid fall in 1971
and in reverse a sharp increase in 1973. Each coincides with the US
abandonment of the gold standard, and either the start of the ﬂoating
2There are numerous empirical studies on the recent US velocity or money
demand: for example, Mehra(1993), Thornton(1995), Miyao(1996a), McGrat-
tan(1998), Carlson, Hoﬀman, Keen and Rasche(2000), and Ball(2001). As a whole,
the literature suggests unstable demand for money in the 1980s and the restoration
of the stability since the 1990s.THE GOODHART’S LAW 3
exchange rates or the ﬁrst oil crisis that arose from the OPEC’s oil
embargo, the eﬀects of which we will address below.
2.1. Descriptive statistics. We list some descriptive statistics on ve-
locity of money in Japan: the mean, standard deviation, coeﬃcient of
variation, and correlations with output growth rates, money growth
rates, or nominal interest rates. The results are in Table 1. The calcu-
lations are for the full sample period 1968:1 to 2004:3 and the limited
sample ending at 1995:2. A choice of the latter sample is motivated by
less variability of money growth rates after 1995 than before, as appar-
ent in Figure 1. It is evident that the mean value of velocity is lower
and the variations are higher for the full sample than for the limited
one excluding the observations of low monetary volatility. According to
the Friedman’s hypothesis of money supply volatility(Friedman, 1983;
Hall and Noble, 1987; Mehra, 1989), a decline in velocity and an in-
crease in its volatility could be caused by an increase in volatility of
money growth. Table 1 suggests evidence against the hypothesis. We
also observe a procyclicality of money velocity in the Japanese data.
2.2. Stationarity. The detrended data of velocity may probably be
of high serial correlation. We test stationarity of the Japanese data
on money velocity using ﬁve unit root tests: the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test(Dickey and Fuller, 1979; ADF); the modiﬁed Dickey-Fuller
test based on GLS detrended series(Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock, 1996;
DF-GLS); the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock point optimal test(Elliot, Rothen-
berg and Stock, 1996; ERS); the Phillips-Perron test(Phillips and Per-
ron, 1988; PP); the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shintest(Kwiatkowski,
Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992; KPSS). Note that a null hypothesis
of all the tests except for the KPSS is a unit root.
The estimation period is limited up to 1995:2, taking into account
any structural break in money demand detected by Nakashima and
Saito(2004). The data is natural-log transformed. All the tests in-
clude a constant and a linear time trend. Lag lengths for correcting
serial correlation in the ADF and DF-GLS, lag lengths for AR spectral
regression in the ERS, and bandwidth in a Bartlett kernel for KPSS
and PP are chosen based on Schwartz criterion. Table 2 supports sta-
tionarity of the level data as well as the ﬁrst diﬀerence series, or the
velocity being integrated of order one I(0). Any tests else than the
Phillips-Perron type can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, and
the KPSS test cannot reject the null hypothesis of stationarity.
2.3. GMM estimates. We estimate a velocity function in which the
logged money velocity depends on the call rates besides a constant. In-
stead of cointegration tests which literature on money demand(Miyao,
1996b; Nakashima and Saito, 2004) pursued, we choose a GMM esti-
mator, based on the unit root tests supporting stationarity of money4 Y. TAKEDA AND A. UEDA
velocity. Bandwidth in a Bartlett kernel is ﬁxed at 4 and the instru-
mental variables include three lags of the dependent and independent
variables as well as a constant. Following Miyao(1996b), we split the
full sample period of 1968:1 to 1995:2 into three types of subsample:
1968:1 to 1985:4, 1968:1 to 1989:4, and 1986:1 to 1995:2. The end and
the beginning dates in the ﬁrst and the third subsamples correspond to
when a series of ﬁnancial deregulations on interest rates started, while
the second subsample is motivated by a fact that the asset bubbles in
Japan had burst in 1989.
Table 3 shows the GMM estimates. The interest-rate semi-elasticity
of money demand is estimated as equal to 0.04 for the full sample pe-
riod. It is also evident that the parameter of the semi-elasticity exhibits
instability, crucially depending on the sample periods. The recent sub-
sample starting from 1986:1 particularly presents a signiﬁcant positive
relationship between money demand and nominal interest rates.
Figure 2 compares the actual values of money velocity to the predic-
tions using the GMM estimates for the full sample period. Apparently,
though the residuals display a high serial correlation, the predictions
coincide with the timing of peaks and bottoms in the actual values
up to the middle of the 70s. However, we cannot trace the downward
trend in money velocity.
2.4. Changes in monetary policy. The residuals in Figure 2 indi-
cate the observations of money velocity that deviate from the GMM
predictions. We ﬁnd three consecutive periods when the deviations
range over a ±1 standard error band: the early 70s, during the second
half of 70s, and around 1990. Following the chronological studies of the
Japanese monetary policy(Ito, 1993; Okina, 1993; Cargill, Hutchison
and Ito, 1997), we can plausibly provide characterizations associated
with these periods as when the Japanese monetary policy considerably
changed. 3
In 1971, Japan was faced with the US suspension of the dollar’s
convertibility into gold, so that it abandoned the ﬁxed exchange rate
system at 360 yen per dollar. After the Smithsonian Agreement set the
exchange rate at 308 yen per dollar afterward, the exchange rates led
to ﬂoating in 1973. During these few years, the Japanese government
made eﬀorts to keep the yen from overvaluing relative to 360 or 308
yen per dollar.ʠThe Bank of Japan maintained high monetary growth
in 1972-73 in order to keep the yen from appreciating further from the
Smithsonian rate. This attempt to keep the yen undervalued created
substantial inﬂationary pressureʡ (p.127, Ito, 1993). The ﬁrst oil crisis
beginning in 1973 further accelerated inﬂation. The Bank of Japan in
3Throughout the 1960s, the primary instrument of monetary policy by the Bank
of Japan was the window guidance, which quantitatively limited commercial bank
lendings. The window guidance policy oﬃcially continued till 1991.THE GOODHART’S LAW 5
reverse withdrew the excess liquidity in order to check those inﬂationary
trend, resulting in a sharp increase in the velocity.
After the wild inﬂation in 1973-74, the Bank of Japan announced
a new monetary policy procedure in 1975. Then the Bank of Japan
came to emphasize money supply as an intermediate target, publishing
a monetary forecast of annual changes in M2+CDs(Chapter 3, Cargill,
Hutchison and Ito, 1997). Since the announcements of the monetary
forecast, variability in monetary growth had been stabilized, as ob-
served in Figure 1.
Consequently, the cause of the variations in velocity for those periods
in the 70s may lie in such changes in monetary controls by the Bank
of Japan.
Concerning the unpredictable velocity around 1990, however, there
are disparate empirical evidences(Okina, 1993). On one hand, as is evi-
dent from the GMM estimates in Table 3, there were likely to be struc-
tural changes in money velocity in the second half of the 1980s. The
parameters instability is probably due to the ﬁnancial deregulations
since 1985 or/and to the asset price bubble that had burst in 1989. On
the other hand, Cargill, Hutchison and Ito(1997) show out-of-sample
forecasts of their estimated money demand functions, indicating ʠthat
a shift in the stance of monetary policy, and not ﬁnancial deregulation,
was primarily responsible for rapid monetary growth during 1987-89 ʡ
(p.59, Cargill, Hutchison and Ito, 1997).
3. A cash-in-advance economy with monetary regime
switching
In order to account for the stochastic structures of velocity shown in
Section 2, we construct a cash-in-advance economy.
3.1. A cash-credit model. We follow the cash-in-advance model pro-
posed by Hodrick, Kocherlakota and Lucas(1991). Consider a repre-
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where c1t denotes cash goods that must be purchased with cash held
in the ﬁrst subperiod, and c2t denotes credit goods that can be paid
in the second subperiod later. The goods are purchased in the ﬁrst
subperiod, and money and stocks are traded in the second subperiod
in the market. Thus, credit goods are purchased in the ﬁrst subperiod,
and credit accounts are cleared in the second subperiod. Note that
agents face no uncertainty between the ﬁrst and second subperiods.6 Y. TAKEDA AND A. UEDA
Now the cash-in-advance constraint is given by
Ptc1t ≤ Mt
where Pt denotes the price of two types of goods, and Mt denotes the
cash held in the ﬁrst subperiod. The budget constraint is given by
Mt+1 + Qtzt+1 = ztPtyt + Qtzt +( ωt − 1)Xt + Mt − Pt(c1t + c2t)
where zt denotes shares of stock, Qt denotes stock price, Xt denotes
monetary supply, and ωt = Xt+1/Xt implies that (ωt − 1)Xt indicates
a lump-sum money transfer. With the market clearing condition, Xt =
Mt, zt = 1, and c1t + c2t = yt where yt denotes the total output of
cash goods and credit goods, and the growth of output gt = yt/yt−1.
Following Svensson(1985) and Lucas and Stokey(1987), we assume that




where ft implies state variables described later. The credit-goods con-
sumption can be expressed as c2t =( gt − c(ft))yt−1, and the marginal
















u2(ft)=( 1− ψ)(gt − c(ft))
(1−ψ)(1−α)−1c(ft)
ψ(1−α). (2)
Deﬁning m(ft)=1 /p(ft), the cash-in-advance constraint can be rewrit-
ten as
c(ft) ≤ m(ft). (3)
Introducing the multipliers µ(ft) for the cash-in-advance constraint,








with the Kuhn-Tucker condition
µ(ft) ≥ 0 and µ(ft)(m(ft) − c(ft)) = 0. (6)THE GOODHART’S LAW 7
Nominal interest rate is deﬁned from nominal present value of a
nominal bond held at the end of period t that pays one unit of money























also using the formula of goods price.
While Hodrick, Kocherlakota and Lucas(1991) assume an exogenous
state ft = {gt,ω t} that follows a Markov process, we consider the
money growth ωt as an explanatory variable in a policy rule that de-
pends on a policy state st. For simplicity, we assume such an infor-
mation structure that the policy state st is observable for both private
agents and central bank. Thus, in this paper, state ft = {gt,s t}.
In the model, a stationary equilibrium is a set of functions {c(ft),m(ft),µ(ft),ω(ft)}
satisfying Equation (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6). Nominal interest
rates, inﬂation rates and velocity are determined vis-a-vis a stationary
equilibrium.
3.2. Monetary policy rule. We incorporate into the cash-in-advance
economy a monetary policy rule, in which monetary policy regimes
can switch according to a Markov process. We identify each monetary
policy regime, depending on how systematic central bank’s monetary
targeting is in controlling nominal interest rates. Thus, we ignore roles
of an unsystematic part consisting of random shocks to monetary policy
rule, as analyzed in the VAR literature on monetary policy.
Following Ireland(2001, 2003, 2004) and Leeper and Roush(2003),
we assume a generalized Taylor-type rule as follows:
it = θ0(st)+θ1(st)Et[πt+1]+θ2(st)ωt (10)
where the second term relates to the Taylor principle. Such a gener-
alized policy rule deserves comparisons with the standard Taylor-type
rule(Taylor, 1993).
First, as an explanatory variable in the forward-looking Taylor-type
rule(Woodford, 2003), are not actual rates of inﬂation but the expected
rates used for simplicity in solving the model.
Second, money growth rates are an explanatory variable added to
the standard Taylor-type rule. Literature suggests two interpretations
on roles of money growth in the nominal interest rate rule. One is8 Y. TAKEDA AND A. UEDA
as information variable(Ireland, 2001, 2003, 2004; Leeper and Roush,
2003), which is on the basis of the conventional paper of Poole(1970). It
suggests that it is desirable for central banks to control nominal interest
rates so as to endogenously accommodate shocks to money demand,
predicting any changes in ﬁnancial environments. The informational
role of money growth requires a positive coeﬃcient θ2 on money growth
rates in the generalized Taylor-type rule.
The other interpretation of money growth is as intermediate tar-
get(Christiano and Rostagno, 2001), what is our standpoint in con-
sidering possibilities of the Goodhart’s Law in an application of the
generalized Taylor-type rule. Exogenous concern of central bank over
money growth could be perceived in the generalized rule with nega-
tive coeﬃcient θ2. According to the Goodhart’s Law, such concern
ʠfor control purposesʡ would perilously causes variations in velocity of
money.
4. Computation of the model
4.1. Markov regime switching of monetary policy. Following
Ireland(2001, 2003, 2004) and Leeper and Roush(2003), we estimate
the following equation of monetary policy rule
it = θ0(st)+θ1(st)Et[πt+1]+θ2(st)ωt + εt(st). (11)
All the coeﬃcients on the independent variables including constant
and error terms depend on the monetary policy regime st each period.
Following Hamilton(1989), we estimate a Markov switching model of
monetary policy regimes.
Prior to a Markov regime switching model, for a comparison, we use
GMM estimator to estimate a generalized Taylor-type rule where there
are assumed to be no regime switchings in monetary policy. We choose
observations ending at 1995:2, since the zero bound of nominal interest
rates seems to have been eﬀective for the Bank of Japan, as obvious
in Figure 1. The zero bound is another consideration for the Bank of
Japan else than what this paper focuses on. The estimates for sample
period 1968:1-1995:2 are as follows(standard errors in brackets):
it =2 .28 +1.09πt+1 +0.47ωt +εt
[0.70] [0.21] [0.23] [2.42]
The positive coeﬃcient on money growth rates indicates the endoge-
nous money supply by central bank. The endogenous money supply
aims at accommodating shocks to money demand, resulting in interest
rate smoothing. 4 Note that in the estimated policy rule, the money
growth plays a role of information variable, which the Goodhart’s Law
does not presume.
4The term endogenous money supply may be misleading, since there is another
class of endogenous money supply with the instrument monetary aggregates rather
than nominal interest rates(Gavin and Kydland, 1999).THE GOODHART’S LAW 9
In a Markov regime switching model, we only allowfor two states(st =
1, 2) identiﬁed depending on a parameter θ2(st) in monetary policy
rule. Table 4 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of an unre-
stricted model, as well as two models with equality restrictions on either
coeﬃcients or standard errors in the regressions. Either the Schwartz
criterion, Akaike information criterion or log likelihood test favors the
unrestricted model. Moreover, as a result of the Wald coeﬃcient tests
in the restricted model, we can identify st = 1 not only as a state
where less active responses to inﬂation rates are exhibited, but also
where monetary growth rates are more focused on as a policy target by
the Bank of Japan. In the other state 2, since the coeﬃcient θ2(st =2 )
is insigniﬁcant, the standard Taylor-type rule meeting the Taylor prin-
ciple is introduced. The estimated stationary transition probabilities











In particular, it is evident that the active Taylor-type rule is quite
persistently followed in state 2.
4.2. Parameters. Based on the Japanese GDP growth data from
1968:1 and 1995:2, we discretize the quarterly output growth of the
full range of [-0.3%, 1.5%] into 18 ranks by 0.1%, and pick up the
middle point {-0.25%, -0.15%, -0.05%, 0.05%, ..., 1.35%, 1.45%}. The
state of policy rule is assumed to be two states {1,2}. These two states
are assumed to be independent, and thus, the total number of states
becomes 36.
Monetary policy equation is from unrestricted ML estimates of the
Markov regime switching model in Table 4:
it =0 .012064 + 0.990979Et[πt+1] − 0.329413ωt
for st = 1, and
it =0 .010130 + 1.811579Et[πt+1]+0 .003648ωt
for st = 2, transforming annual percentage data to quarterly process
expressed as ratio in the model. Markov transition probability matrix
of the policy state st is also from the same estimation result.
Markov transition probability matrix of the output growth gt is con-
structed with the standard deviation 0.1582% of diﬀerences between gt
and gt+1. Assuming the normal distribution, the probability from gt =
gi to gt+1 = {gi−5,g i−4,g i−3,g i−2,g i−1,g i,g i+1,g i+2,g i+3,g i+4,g i+5} be-
comes {0.00223, 0.01125, 0.04357, 0.11451, 0.20444, 0.24800, 0.20444,
0.11451, 0.04357, 0.01125, 0.00223}. When the matrix is truncated,
the probability is re-calculated without truncated states; for example,
a transition probability from gt = g1 to gt+1 = {g1,g 2,g 3,g 4,g 5} be-
comes {0.24800, 0.20444, 0.11451, 0.04357, 0.01125, 0.00223} divided
by the total of 0.62400.10 Y. TAKEDA AND A. UEDA
Discount factor β is assumed to be 0.98, and ψ and α in the instan-
taneous utility function is assumed to be 0.5 and 3.0, respectively.
4.3. Solution algorithm. When the cash-in-advance constraint is not
binding at the state ft = fi, the multiplier µt must be zero. From
Equation (4), u1(ft = fi)=u2(ft = fi), and from Equation (1), (2)
and (3), this leads to c(ft = fi)=ψgt that must be strictly smaller




t =0 . (12)
where ω(ft) is reduced from the monetary policy equations.
On the other hand, when the cash-in-advance constraint is binding
at the state ft = fi, it implies that ψgt >c (ft = fi)=m(ft = fi) and




t =0 . (13)
Note that the diﬀerence between Equation (12) and Equation (13) lies
in whether the marginal utility at period t is of either cash-goods or
credit goods.
Hodrick, Kocherlakota and Lucas(1991) proposes an algorithm to
obtain m(ft) using discretized {gt,ω t} with 16 states. Although the
proposed algorithm using simple iterations in Appendix B in Hodrick,
Kocherlakota and Lucas(1991) show good performance with exogenous
money growth process, it fails to obtain our solution with the endoge-
nous money growth. Therefore, we solve a set of 36 nonlinear equations
of either of the above ﬁrst-order condition at each discretized states fi,
using a pre-supplied numerical library IMSL of FORTRAN. An initial
guess is set as m(fi)=ψgi.
4.4. Results. We compare the predictions of our cash-credit model in-
cluding either the regime switching rule or the estimated state-independent
rule. Note that the former model supposes the money supply’s role as
intermediate target, while the latter does the informational role. Fig-
ure 5 indicates the money velocity predicted by either of the model.
It is apparent that neither prediction of the model can totally follow
the actual velocity data. In case of the GMM estimates, the predicted
velocity appears nearly ﬁxed around 2.1. On the other hand, although
the Markov regime switching rule cannot bring into existence the down-
ward trend in the velocity, it barely generates the ﬂuctuations in the
middle of the 1970s. Table 5 presents another evidence of the advantage
of the regime-dependent rule over the independent one. We ﬁnd better
statistics in the model’s predictions relative to the GMM estimates,
especially in terms of both the coeﬃcient of variation and the standard
deviation. These evidences weakly suggest that the Goodhart’s Law is
obtained in Japan.THE GOODHART’S LAW 11
However, there remain some stochastic properties of the Japanese
data to be accounted for: for example, the downward trend and pro-
cyclicality of velocity, and the large variations in money growth rates.
Further analyses will be needed.
5. Conclusion
This paper addresses the Goodhart’s Law in a cash-credit model with
a generalized Taylor-type rule depending on policy regimes. Using the
Japanese data of the money velocity, we found that although our cash-
credit model fails to generate a downward trend in the actual velocity,
the model succeeds in terms of velocity’s variation and correlations
with money growth rates or nominal interest rates, with procyclicality
of velocity unpredictable.
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velocity, right axis
money growth rates(M2+CDs, annual, %)
call rates(annual, %)
Note: Japan, quarterly, 1967:1-2004:3. Velocity of money is measured as
a ratio of (seasonally adjusted) nominal GDP divided by M2+CDs(average
amounts outstanding).THE GOODHART’S LAW 15












1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
residuals, left axis actual values predictions
Note: Japan, quarterly, 1968:1-1995:2. Fitted values are calculated from
GMM estimates. Thinner dotted lines indicate ±1 standard errors of the
residuals.16 Y. TAKEDA AND A. UEDA
Figure 3. Predictions of call rates with Markov regime
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GMM estimates Markov regime switching call rates(annual, %)
Note: Japan, quarterly, 1968:1-1995:2. Markov regime switching case is
predicted using the transition probabilities.THE GOODHART’S LAW 17
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velocity, left axis transition prob. of state 1, right axis
Note: Japan, quarterly, 1968:1-1995:2.18 Y. TAKEDA AND A. UEDA









1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
model's predictions GMM predictions actual values
Note: Japan, quarterly, 1968:1-1995:2. Markov regime switching case is
predicted using the transition probabilities.THE GOODHART’S LAW 19
Table 1. Sample statistics of money velocity
sample periods statistics
(quarters) mean(v) std(v) cv(v) corr(v,g) corr(v,ω) corr(v,i)
68:1-2004:3 1.08 0.23 0.21 0.61 0.79 0.77
68:1-95:2 1.17 0.19 0.16 0.55 0.68 0.63
Note: Japan. Statistics on velocity(v)are the mean mean(v),
standard deviation std(v), coeﬃcient of variation cv(v) and
correlations of velocity corr(v,·). g, ω and i denote output
growth rates, money growth rates and nominal interest rates.








Note: Japan, quarterly, 1968:1-1995:2. The data is natural-
log transformed. All the tests include a constant and a linear
time trend. Lag lengths or bandwidths are in each paren-
thesis. Lag lengths for correcting serial correlation in the
ADF(Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and DF-GLS(Elliot, Rothen-
berg and Stock, 1996), lag lengths for AR spectral regression
in the ERS(Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock, 1996), and band-
width in a Bartlett kernel for PP(Phillips and Perron, 1988)
and KPSS(Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin, 1992)
are chosen based on Schwartz criterion. Test critical values
are as follows: -4.04, -3.45, -3.15(t-statistics in ADF and PP);
-3.57, -3.02, -2.73(t-statistics in DF-GLS); 4.23, 5.64, 6.80(p-
statistics in ERS); 0.216, 0.146, 0.119(LM statistics in KPSS)
for 1%, 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively. Each *,
** or *** remarks a rejection of each null hypothesis in 1%,
5% or 10% signiﬁcance level. A null hypothesis of all the
tests except for the KPSS is a unit root.20 Y. TAKEDA AND A. UEDA
Table 3. GMM estimates of money velocity function
sample periods coeﬃcients





Note: Japan. In each parenthesis, standard errors of the co-
eﬃcient are reported. The data of money velocity is natural-
log transformed. Bandwidth in a Bartlett kernel is ﬁxed at
4 and the instrumental variables include three lags of the
dependent and independent variables as well as a constant.
Each *, ** or *** remarks 1%, 5% or 10% levels of signiﬁ-
cance.
Table 4. ML estimates of unrestricted and restricted models
parameters unrestricted model restricted models
equal coeﬃcients equal variances
θ0 4.83(0.32) 4.68(0.31) 4.99(1.07)
4.05(0.35) 3.85(0.29)
θ1 0.99(0.04) 1.05(0.14) 1.03(0.14)
1.81(0.17)* 2.25(0.16)*
θ2 -0.33(0.05) -0.04(0.07) -0.35(0.14)
0.004(0.08)* -0.11(0.07)
σ 0.61(0.08) 1.19(0.1616) 1.21(0.09)
1.42(0.13)* 2.59(0.53)*
log LH -184.35 -215.85 -190.00
SC 3.78 4.22 3.84
AIC 3.53 4.05 3.62
LR - 6.58e-14 0.0004
Note: Japan, quarterly, 1968:1-1995:2. Estimates in the up-
per and lower row correspond to ones in state 1 or state 2,
respectively. In each parenthesis, standard errors of the coef-
ﬁcient are reported. 1% signiﬁcance of coeﬃcient or variance
inequality between two states is indicated by ∗ as shown by
Wald coeﬃcient tests. SC, AIC and LR mean Schwartz crite-
rion, Akaike information criterion and p-value from χ2(k) for
log likelihood ratio test where k is the number of restrictions,
respectively.THE GOODHART’S LAW 21
Table 5. Statistics of actual and predicted money velocity
statistics sample predictions
model GMM
mean(v) 1.17 1.91 2.09
std(v) 0.19 0.19 0.03
cv(v) 0.16 0.10 0.01
corr(v,g) 0.55 −0.12 1.00
corr(v,ω) 0.68 0.95 1.00
corr(v,i) 0.63 0.70 1.00
cv(ω) 0.53 0.04 0.02
cv(i) 0.40 0.67 0.31
Note: Japan, quarterly, 1968:1-1995:2. Statistics on
velocity(v) are mean mean(v), standard deviation std(v),
coeﬃcient of variation cv(v) and correlations of velocity
corr(v,·). g, ω and i denote output growth rates, money
growth rates and nominal interest rates.